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Abstract—The proliferation of highly capable mobile devices
such as smartphones and tablets has significantly increased the
demand for wireless access. Software defined network (SDN)
at edge is viewed as one promising technology to simplify the
traffic offloading process for current wireless networks. In this
paper, we investigate the incentive problem in SDN-at-edge
of how to motivate a third party access points (APs) such
as WiFi and smallcells to offload traffic for the central base
stations (BSs). The APs will only admit the traffic from the
BS under the precondition that their own traffic demand is
satisfied. Under the information asymmetry that the APs know
more about own traffic demands, the BS needs to distribute
the payment in accordance with the APs’ idle capacity to
maintain a compatible incentive. First, we apply a contract-
theoretic approach to model and analyze the service trading
between the BS and APs. Furthermore, other two incentive
mechanisms: optimal discrimination contract and linear pricing
contract are introduced to serve as the comparisons of the anti
adverse selection contract. Finally, the simulation results show
that the contract can effectively incentivize APs’ participation
and offload the cellular network traffic. Furthermore, the anti
adverse selection contract achieves the optimal outcome under
the information asymmetry scenario.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, people use access various sophisticated ser-
vices such as search engine, email, GPS navigation, stream-
ing video, and online games from their mobile terminals
through wireless access networks [1]. Wireless has become
the primary access method for more and more people. The
global mobile data traffic has reached 1.5 exabytes per month
at the end of 2013, and will increase nearly 11-fold between
2013 and 2018, reaching 15.9 exabytes per month by 2018
[2]. The rapid increase in the mobile network traffic far
exceeds the growth in service revenues as well as in the
budgets required to address the new demands. Consequently,
mobile service operators (MSOs) need to enhance their
infrastructures and services in a timely and cost-effective
manner to carry higher volumes of traffic and support more
sophisticated services.
Mobile data offloading, which refers to moving traffic form
cellular networks to alternate wireless technologies like WiFi
or smallcell networks, promises to address the tremendous
growth in mobile data and rapidly evolving mobile services.
The mobile data offloading can be enabled by the software
defined network (SDN) at edge, which is able to dynamically
position or reposition the traffic in a mobile network based
on various trigger criteria including the number of mobile
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Fig. 1: An illustration of mobile data offloading enabled by
the SDN-at-edge.
users per base station (BS), available bandwidth, IP address
and/or aggregated flow rate [3]. The immediate advantage
of SDN-at-edge is that it simplifies network management
in a dense network [4]. The software-defined radio access
network (RAN) concept [5] abstracts all independent BSs
as a virtual centralized BS, which performs control plane
decisions for all independent BSs at a single place. The
distributed control plane in conventional RANs is therefore
turned into a centralized software defined control plane [6].
The system model is illustrated in Fig. 1. The central BS
optimizes the network performance with global knowledge
of the whole network, and can potentially adapt to the traffic
variations in the network.
In this model, the access network discovery and selection
function (ANDSF) can discover wireless network access
points (APs) close to the mobile user and perform the mobile
data offloading. The ANDSF will interact with the virtual
centralized BS of the SDN for the offloading management,
which can be implemented by standardized interfaces such
as OpenFlow [7]. Now MSOs have already deployed their
own WiFi APs or initiated collaboration with existing WiFi
networks to enable mobile data offloading. The SDN-at-
edge can significantly alleviate both costs and operational
challenges incurred by the simultaneous operation of access
networks over multiple wireless technologies.
Offloading traffic through WiFi or smallcell APs is theo-
retically feasible. However, it is practically difficult as APs
are owned by third-party and have their own traffic demand.
In order to attract the APs to open their network access
to cellular users, we assume that the virtual centralized BS
will offer a payment based on the amount of traffic that the
AP is able to offload. Meanwhile, the AP must guarantee
that its own traffic is being processed first, and will only
help the BS offload traffic with its idle capacity which is a
private information of the APs. In practice, there exists an
information asymmetry that the APs know more about their
idle capacity than the BS. As we assume that all APs are
selfish, they will pretend that they have large idle capacity,
and thus can request more payment from the BS, which is
an undesirable situation for the BS. Thus, we need to find a
proper mechanism to ensure that the payments to APs match
with the traffic they can offload, and thus, overcome the
information asymmetry.
The model from contract theory provides us a useful
tool to design such a mechanism. First, the contract can
construct several traffic-payment bundles, which specify the
amount of traffic that the AP needs to offload, and the
corresponding payment that the BS needs to offer. Second,
the contract is incentive compatible, which includes different
traffic-payment bundles that guarantees the payments to APs
are in accordance with the amount of offloaded traffic. Third,
the contract is self revealing, which is designed that the
APs can only achieve the maximum payoff when selecting
the traffic-payment bundle that best fits into their own idle
capacity. In summary, the contract theoretic model provides
an incentive compatible mechanism such that the APs will
select the amount of payments in accordance with the amount
of traffic that they can offload for the BS, and their idle
capacity will be automatically revealed to the BS as if there
does not exist an information asymmetry. We name this
mechanism by anti adverse selection.
Additionally, we study another two contract mechanisms
to compare with the anti adverse selection. The first one
is called perfect discrimination in which the idle capacity
of APs is available to the BS. In this scenario there does
not exist the information asymmetry, the BS can treat each
AP separately and offer a specific contract in accordance
with its idle capacity. Thus, this mechanism can achieve
the first best outcome, and serve as the benchmark of this
problem. The same as the anti adverse selection case, the
second mechanism linear pricing is also under incomplete
information that the BS cannot observe the idle capacity of
the APs. Unlike the anti adverse selection, in linear pricing
the BS only specifies a unit offloading traffic per payment,
and the AP chooses the payment that it wants to maximize
its own payoff.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are as
follows: First we propose a novel approach to solve an
incentive problem in SDN-at-edge using the framework of
contract theory, which is rooted in economics research [8].
Second, we propose the anti adverse selection to obtain an
optimal results under information asymmetry, together with
the perfect discrimination and linear pricing as comparisons.
Finally, we provide thorough simulation results to prove the
effectiveness of the proposed contract and show that the APs
obtain incentives to offload traffic for the BS.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First,
we conduct a literature survey about SDN-at-edge and con-
tract theory in Section II. Then, in Section III, we introduce
the traffic offloading trade in an SDN-at-edge system with
a contract theoretic model. The problem formulation of the
three contracts is well described in Section IV, and we
propose the solution of the three contracts. The performance
evaluation is conducted in Section V. Finally, Section VI
draws the conclusion.
II. RELATED WORK
Over the past few decades, wireless cellular network pay-
loads have been growing fast with the introduction of smart
phones, tablet computers and other new mobile devices. The
development of long term evolution (LTE) is one effective
way to increase the capacity of current network [1]. New
technologies such as Device-to-Device (D2D) communica-
tion, WiFi, and smallcell have been introduced to offload
traffic from the current wireless network. In D2D commu-
nication, devices are able to communicate with each other
without requiring a dedicated wireless AP [9]. While con-
ventional WiFi networks are typically based on the presence
of controller devices known as wireless APs [10]. Moreover,
placing several smallcells in high dense cellular network is
another widely adopted method that can offload the cellular
network’s traffic while be more energy efficient [11].
As the cells tend to be smaller, and thus, the wireless
infrastructure is becoming denser and heterogeneous. This
gives rise to an unsustainable increase in complexity on
network operations spanning across different layers due to
the tight coupling in control plane decision-makings at neigh-
boring BSs [12]. It becomes necessary to design a more
flexible SDN-at-edge type of architecture. While as the SDN-
at-edge is controlled by a visual centralized BS, a failure of
the controller can negatively compromise resilience of the
whole network [13]. The work in [14] proposes a potential
solution to find a proper traffic offloading mechanism. While
this work is based on the assumption that all APs are willing
to participate in the process. The novelty of our work is that
we look at the problem in an economical way. Particularly,
we use the framework of contract theory to model the service
trading between the BS and APs.
There have been some works which try to solve the AP’s
incentive problem in traffic offloading that are rooted in
economics. The mechanism in [15] assumes that the mobile
virtual network operator offers some free data quota to
hosts as reimbursements (incentives) for connectivity shar-
ing. Similarly, the work in [16] investigates a bandwidth
trading marketplace, where a mobile operator can lease the
bandwidth made available by third parties through their APs.
The work in [17] also considers a market based mobile data
offloading, while the system model is with multiple BSs
and multiple APs. The work in [18] designs a distributed
incentive mechanism ensures that the contribution of user,
measured in the delivered mobile data, are Pareto efficient
and proportionally fair, such that mobile users are willing to
connect with each other and share their Internet connections.
However, to our knowledge, few existing literatures adopt the
contract theory to model the incentive mechanisms which can
effectively attract user’s participation.
Contract theory has been applied in some other areas.The
work in [19] brings the contract theoretical model into
the area of cloud computing. The authors highlight eco-
nomic factors and their goal is to optimize the revenue of
cloud server, taking into consideration of users’ valuation
of server’s various characteristics in market. In [20], the
authors provide incentive compatible contracts to smartphone
users to encourage them participating in data acquisition
and distributed computing programs. In the area of cognitive
radio networks, a number of works have already developed
contract-theoretic techniques such as [21] and [22]. In these
works, the authors model the primary user (PU) as a seller
who sells spectrum resources to the secondary users (SUs)
which are regarded as buyers. In [23], the authors proposed
a system model which the PUs “employ” the SUs to forward
their data so as to achieve higher data rates and better quality
of service (QoS). However, It is difficult for the contract
theoretical models in the previous works to be implemented
directly into SDN-at-edge.
In summary, while traffic offloading from cellular networks
have been widely studied, few literature has investigated the
problem of providing incentives for APs to offload traffic in
SDN-at-edge using contract theory as proposed in this paper.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider an SDN-at-edge with a virtual centralized BS that
consists of several independent BSs, and multiple APs. Users
can access the network through the independent BSs directly,
or via the APs. The APs have their own traffic demand, and
will only offload the cellular traffic for the BS with their idle
capacity. The idle capacity of the AP is private information
which is unobservable for the virtual centralized BS. The APs
will trade with the central BS for helping offload the cellular
traffic. We simply call the BS which refers to the virtual
centralized BS in the following part. The contract that the
BS offers is aiming at maximizing the offloading traffic. In
the following subsections, we will first give a definition of
AP type, and then model the payoffs of the BS and APs
based on the contract.
A. Definition of Type
We define the AP type θ to be a representation of each
AP’s idle capacity which is the AP’s total capacity minus
the reserved capacity for its own traffic demand. Typically,
high type APs can offload more traffic for the BS, and thus,
are more preferred by the BS, and will receive more payment.
In practice, the idle capacity of all APs is a continuous
variable. Thus, θ which represents an AP’s idle capacity is
a continuous value. If the BS offers every AP a specific
contract, the computational complexity is high if the number
of APs is large. The task will be computational complex
and time consuming, thus not preferable in reality. Thus, to
simplify the model from continuous case to a discrete case,
we group the APs that have a similar range of idle capacity
into the same type, and divide AP types into a finite number.
Definition 1. We divide the APs’ idle capacity into K types:
type-1, . . ., type-k, . . ., type-K. We denote the types of APs
by θ1, . . . , θk, . . . , θK , which are grouped in an increasing
order of indices, i.e.,
θ1 < · · · < θk < · · · < θK , k ∈ Z. (1)
Here, we assume that each of the K APs belongs to one
of the K types. Thus, the number of AP s in each type is 1.
For A higher θ implies a larger idle capacity to offload more
cellular traffic. The BS does not know exactly the type of
AP; however, it has the knowledge of the probability that an
AP belongs to a certain type-k with k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} which
is represented by βk, where
∑K
k=1 βk = 1.
If any APs are available to users, the BS will offer
contracts to those potential “employees” (APs) to open the
network access to the users. However, different APs may
have different properties (e.g. own traffic load and signal
strength), the traffic offloading capacity will also differ from
each other. To attract APs to offload traffic for the BS,
contracts with compatible incentives must be provided. Thus,
it is necessary for the BS to offer different traffic-payment
bundles according to each AP’s type θk. For different APs
that have different idle capacity, the BS will offer them a
contract (T (q), q) which includes different traffic-payment
bundles. The T (q) is the payment to the APs, and q is the
amount of traffic offloaded by the APs. For simplicity, we
write the contract designed for type-k as (Tk, qk). The APs
are free to accept or decline any type of contracts. If the AP
declines to receive any contract, we assume that the AP signs
a contract of (T (0), 0). The AP chooses not to offload any
traffic for the BS, and the BS will not pay the AP.
Different APs have different idle capacities, and thus, will
affect their payoffs during the traffic offloading process. This
in return will also affect the BS’s payoff and its strategy of
offering contracts in the end. In the following subsections,
we will define the payoffs of the BS and APs based on the
signed contract.
B. Payoff of the Base Station
In this subsection, we define the payoff of the BS when
contracting with APs for traffic offloading. The BS receives
benefit when traffic is offloaded via an AP, while it also has
a cost on the payment to the AP. The payment to APs can be
monetary or any other forms that can incentivize APs. The
payoff of the BS when offloading traffic by a type-k AP is
defined as the offloaded traffic from the BS minus the cost
on payment to APs, i.e.,
U(k) = aqk − cTk, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, (2)
where a is the BS’s unit monetary gain through the offloaded
traffic, and c is the BS’s unit cost on the payment T . As the
variable a is mainly served as a transfer of the traffic gain
to monetary gain to make the unit in the payoff function
consistent. Thus, the numerical value of a does not affect the
optimization problem we will formulate. Thus, for simplicity,
we assume a = 1 here. The BS always wants to maximize its
payoff by offloading the maximum traffic with the minimum
payment. Apparently, the BS will not accept a negative payoff
when offloading traffic through AP. In other words, we must
guarantee that the trading with an AP is beneficial for the
BS. Thus, we must have qk − cTk ≥ 0. Otherwise, the BS
will choose not to ask the AP to offload traffic.
C. Payoff of the Access Point
First, we define the valuation function v(T ) of the APs
regarding the payments T , as the benefit of AP when offload-
ing traffic for the BS. v(T ) is a strictly increasing concave
function of T , where v(0) = 0, v′(T ) > 0, and v′′(T ) < 0,
∀T . We find that as the amount of payment increases, the
satisfaction brought to the APs grows more slowly.
Then, we define the payoff of an AP of type-k when sign-
ing a contract (Tk, qk) with the BS for the traffic offloading
process as:
V (k) = θkv(Tk)− c
′qk, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, (3)
where c′ is the AP’s unit cost on offloading traffic for the
BS. For simplicity, we assume c′ = 1 here. The payoff of an
AP is the valuation regarding the payments minus the cost
in traffic offloading. Such a cost can be power consumption,
operating cost, etc.
We assume that every AP is rational. To attract the APs
to participate in the traffic offloading process for the BS,
the payoff that the AP receives must satisfy the following
constraints.
Definition 2. Individual Rationality (IR): An AP will only
choose to trade when the payoff that it receives is not less
than its payoff that when it does not participate in the traffic
offloading process, i.e.,
V (k) = θkv(Tk)− qk ≥ V˜ (k), ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, (4)
where V˜ (k) is the reservation revenue of type-k APs when
they do not take the BS’s offer.
Here, we use θk to weight the valuation of money in the
utility function to represent the utility gain from the rewards.
The reason for this definition is that, as we have defined
θ as the AP’s idle capacity, the larger idle capacity an AP
has, the more interest the AP to sell those idle capacity for
monetary gain. Thus, the higher type of AP with larger idle
capacity, the higher valuation of money. In our system model,
we normalize V˜ = 0 without lose of generality. An AP will
choose not to trade if its payoff is negative. In other words,
the contract is feasible if and only if AP’s payoff is equal
to or greater than 0. Clearly, the BS wants to offer the APs
as little payment as possible, and leave the APs with zero
payoff. However, as the BS has limited information about
the APs’ types, it is hard to set the contract bundle (Tk, qk)
to make the AP’s payoff V (k) = 0 exactly. Usually, the BS
will offer a traffic-payment bundle that brings positive payoff
to the AP, which is called the information rent.
We assume that each AP is selfish and wants to maximize
its own payoff. In particular, the APs want to achieve as
much payment as they can, but offload as little traffic as they
could. To guarantee that the contract is incentive compatible
and each AP will receive the amount of reward in accordance
with the traffic they offloaded, the following constraints must
be satisfied.
Definition 3. Incentive Compatibility (IC): Each AP can
only receive the maximum payoff when selecting the contract
designed for itself, i.e. type θk AP prefers to choose the
contract (Tk, qk) than any other traffic-payment bundles.
θkv(Tk)− qk ≥ θkv(Tl)− ql, ∀k, l ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, k 6= l.
(5)
Under information asymmetry, a feasible contract must
satisfy the IR and IC constraints to ensure every type of APs
are fully motivated, which is called incentive compatibility.
Otherwise, APs will lose the incentive to offload traffic for
the BS.
D. Social Welfare
The social welfare of the network is defined as the sum-
mation of the BS and all APs’ payoffs, i.e.,
Π =
K∑
k=1
U(k) +
K∑
k=1
V (k), (6)
=
K∑
k=1
[θkv(Tk)− cTk].
The social welfare is the difference between the benefit of
traffic offloading θkv(Tk) and the payment cost cTk. The
offloaded traffic is the internal transfer between the BS and
AP and is not counted in the social welfare.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
In this section, we are aiming at obtaining the solution
of the anti adverse selection, which is the optimal incentive
mechanism under the information asymmetry. Before that, we
will present two other mechanisms as the comparisons. First,
we solve the first best perfect discrimination by considering
the ideal scenario where there is no information asymmetry.
Then, we will discuss about the traditional linear pricing
when information asymmetry is introduced. Finally, we will
provide solution of the anti adverse selection which brings
the first best outcome under information asymmetry, and is
the second best outcome when comparing with the ideal case.
A. Perfect Discrimination Contract
The perfect discrimination contract deals with the problem
of service trading between the BS and APs without informa-
tion asymmetry. In particular, the BS is perfectly informed
about the APs’ idle capacities, i.e., the amount of traffic
that they can offload from the cellular network. The BS’s
offloading traffic maximization is
max
(T,q)
K∑
k=1
βk (qk − cTk) , (7)
s.t.
(a) θkv(Tk)− qk ≥ 0. (8)
The problem is under the IR constraint (a) that each AP
obtains a payoff equal to or greater than zero which is the
reservation payoff when not taking the BS’s offer. The IC
constraint is unnecessary here as the BS is aware of the APs’
types, and thus, the APs cannot mimic any other type APs.
As the BS can observe each AP’s type θ, it can treat each
AP separately to solve K optimization problems, defined as
follows:
max
(Tk,qk)
βk (qk − cTk) , (9)
s.t.
(a) θkv(Tk)− qk ≥ 0,
k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
For the selfish BS, it will try to extract as much payoff
from the APs as they can, resulting in a zero payoff of each
AP, i.e.,
θkv(Tk) = qk, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. (10)
Replacing qk with θkv(Tk) and taking the first derivative of
the objective function we have
θkv
′(Tk) = c, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. (11)
As θk and c are initial values, each traffic-payment bundle
(Tk, qk) can be solved by equations (10) and (11). Thus, the
perfect discrimination contract works as, first, let the BS set
the payment to the AP such that the marginal valuation equals
the marginal cost; second, set the amount of offloaded traffic
so as to appropriate the AP’s payoff as zero and leave no
information rent for the AP.
Having the optimal contract (T, q), the payoff of the BS
is thus
U =
K∑
k=1
βk (qk − cTk) . (12)
The social welfare obtained by (6) is
Π =
K∑
k=1
βk (qk − cTk) . (13)
The social welfare has the same value as the payoff of the BS.
As all APs receive zero payoff during the traffic offloading
process, when there is no information asymmetry. The perfect
discrimination gives the first best solution to maximize the
BS’s payoff. The perfect price given in this scenario is also
called price of a perfect competitive market in which the price
is determined by a centralized controller [17]. In this case,
the social welfare and the BS’s payoff achieve the Pareto
efficiency and are maximized.
B. Linear Pricing Contract
Different from that in the perfect discrimination, the BS
is unobservable of the APs’ types. Thus, the optimal traffic-
payment contract (T, q) is no longer feasible. Instead, the
BS will only specify a unit of traffic per payment P for the
offloading process, and the APs will request the amount of
payment T that they want to maximize their own payoffs.
The payoff of each AP becomes
V (k) = θkv(Tk)− PTk, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. (14)
Thus, we see that the amount of offloaded traffic qk = PTk.
With a fixed traffic unit P , requesting more payment Tk
means more traffic qk to offload and more cost. Take the first
derivative of the objective function regarding Tk, we have
θkv
′(Tk) = P, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. (15)
Thus, we can represent the inverse payment request function
Tk as Tk = d(P, θk). As θk is known, we can simply write
Tk = dk(P ) as a function of traffic unit P . The requested
payment curve is a strictly decreasing function of P . As the
traffic unit P per payment is increasing, in order to lower the
AP’s energy/management cost qk = Pdk(P ), less payment
is requested from the BS.
As the BS knows the probability βk that each AP belongs
to a specific type θk, it is easy to have the expected payment
D(P ) requested by the APs, defined as follows:
D(P ) =
K∑
k=1
βkdk(P ). (16)
Thus, the objective function of the BS changes to
U(P ) =
K∑
k=1
βk(qk − cTk), (17)
=
K∑
k=1
βk[Pdk(P )− cdk(P )],
= PD(P )− cD(P ),
= (P − c)D(P ),
where P > c must be satisfied such that the BS will receive
a positive payoff. Otherwise, the BS will manage the traffic
itself. Taking the first condition of the objective function with
respect to P , we obtain the optimal unit traffic per payment
given by
Pm = c−
D(P )
D′(P )
. (18)
This traffic per payment unit Pm is also called the monopoly
price in a monopoly market. The payoff of the BS is thus
U(Pm) = (Pm − c)D(Pm). (19)
The payoff of the APs is thus
V (Pm) =
K∑
k=1
βkθkv[dk(Pm)]− Pmdk(Pm). (20)
The social welfare can be derived by (6).
Taking the first derivative of the payoff of AP V (Pm) with
respect to dk, we have θkv′(dk) = Pm > c. This result
shows that this solution leaves a positive information rent for
all APs when the BS is unobservable of APs’ types. Since
the BS can only make a positive payoff by setting the unit
traffic P greater than the marginal cost c, there is potential
idle capacity that has not been utilized to offload traffic, and
thus, deteriorate the social welfare. In a monopoly market,
the BS sets a higher price than marginal cost, which distorts
the trade-offs in the economy and moves it away from Pareto
efficiency. The social welfare that has been lost is called the
deadweight loss from the monopoly.
C. Anti Adverse Selection Contract
Under the information asymmetry, the BS can receive
more payoff than that offering the linear pricing which only
specifies a traffic per payment unit P to all APs. Indeed, the
BS can still offer different traffic-payment bundles as in the
perfect discrimination case. However, the challenge is that,
under the information asymmetry the perfect discrimination
cannot bring compatible incentive for the APs. When a high
type AP selects the traffic-payment bundle intended for a low
type AP, the high type AP will receives a positive payoff
rather than selecting the bundle designed for itself, which
brings it a zero payoff. Thus, the high type APs will pretend
to be low type APs, and deteriorate the BS’s payoff. Thus, the
perfect discrimination cannot be extended to the information
asymmetry case directly .
To obtain an incentive compatible contract, we propose
the anti adverse selection, in which the BS still offers K
types of traffic-payment bundles as perfect discrimination in
the symmetric information scenario. In order to prevent high
type APs from mimicking the low type APs, we need to add
the IC constraint into the optimization problem of the perfect
discrimination. Therefore, the problem can be expressed as
follows:
max
(T,q)
K∑
k=1
βk (qk − cTk) , (21)
s.t.
(a) θkv(Tk)− qk ≥ 0,
(b) θkv(Tk)− qk ≥ θkv(Tl)− ql,
k, l ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, k 6= l.
The optimization problem is constrained by (a) and (b) which
are the IR and IC constraints, respectively. It has been shown
that for various parameters, the objective function might be
concave or convex, and thus, is not a convex optimization
problem [23]. Here, before we derive the solution, we show
several conditions that guarantee the feasibility of the anti
adverse selection contract.
Remark 1. Monotonicity: Having the type of APs following
the inequality that θ1 < · · · < θk < · · · < θK , BS needs to
offer K a contract with different bundles (Tk, qk) for APs of
K types. For each bundle, the offloaded traffic, payment, and
AP’s payoff have the monotonicity that
q1 < · · · <qk < · · · < qK , (22)
T1 < · · · <Tk < · · · < TK , (23)
0 ≤ V (1) < · · · <V (k) < · · · < V (K). (24)
Proof: To prove this remark, we first prove that Tk > Tl
exists if and only if when θk > θl. From the IC constraint
in Section III.C, we have
θkv(Tk)− qk > θkv(Tl)− ql, (25)
θlv(Tl)− ql > θlv(Tk)− qk, (26)
with k, l ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, k 6= l. We add the two inequalities
above together and have:
θkv(Tk) + θlv(Tl) > θkv(Tl) + θlv(Tk). (27)
If we factor the inequality by v(T ), we have
θkv(Tk)− θlv(Tk) > θlv(Tk)− θlv(Tl), (28)
v(Tk)(θk − θl) > v(Tl)(θk − θl).
As θk > θl, we must have θk − θl > 0, thus, v(Tk) > v(Tl).
From the definition of v(T ), we know that v is a strictly
increasing function of T . As v(Tk) > v(Tl) holds, we must
have Tk > Tl.
If we factor the inequality by θ, we have
θkv(Tk)− θkv(Tl) > θlv(Tk)− θlv(Tl), (29)
θk(v(Tk)− v(Tl)) > θl(v(Tk)− v(Tl)).
As Tk > Tl and v(T ) is strictly increasing with T , we must
have v(Tk) > v(Tl) and v(Tk)−v(Tl) > 0. Thus, by dividing
both sides of the inequality, we get θk > θl. As a result, we
have proved that θk > θl if and only if Tk > Tl.
By now, we have proved the sufficiency and necessity that
for any feasible contract (T, q), Tk > Tl if and only if θk >
θl. Given our assumption in Definition 1 that θ1 < · · · <
θk < · · · < θK , we have
T1 < · · · < Tk < · · · < TK . (30)
As a strictly increasing function of T , the offloading traffic
q satisfies the following condition intuitively:
q1 < · · · < qk < · · · < qK . (31)
When θk > θl, we also have
V (k) = θkv(Tk)− qk > θkv(Tl)− ql (IC), (32)
> θlv(Tl)− ql = V (l),
> θ1v(T1)− q1 = V (1) ≥ 0.
We see that V (k) > V (l) when θk > θl. As θ1 < · · · <
θk < · · · < θK , then
0 ≤ V (1) < · · · < V (k) < · · · < V (K). (33)
Monotonicity implies that the APs of higher type, i.e.,
with the larger idle capacity, receive more payment, together
with higher payoff than those of the APs whose types are
lower. If a high type AP selects the contract designed for
a low type AP, even though a smaller amount of offloaded
traffic is required from the BS, the less payment received
will deteriorate AP’s payoff. Moreover, if a lower type AP
selects a traffic-payment bundle intended for a high type AP,
it needs to vacate part of the capacity intended for its own
traffic which may cause worse cost which will surpass the
payment received.
The monotonicity implies that the contract brings compat-
ible incentives for the APs as high capable APs receive more
payoff than low capable ones. In addition, it shows that the
contract is self revealing as the AP can receive the maximum
payoff if and only if it selects the contract that best fits into
its type. Thus, the problem of high type APs mimicking low
type APs is solved. From [24] we see that the anti adverse
selection specifies a nonlinear traffic for different type APs
instead of a linear traffic as in the linear pricing, and it brings
higher payoffs to the BS and APs, and larger social welfare
than the linear pricing.
From (21) we see that, this problem is not a convex opti-
mization problem. There are K IR constraints and K(K−1)
IC constraints in total. According to [24], we know that all
IR constraints can be removed except
θ1v(T1)− q1 ≥ 0. (34)
For the IC constraints, we only need to keep K − 1 of the
K(K − 1) constraints, which are
θkv(Tk)− qk ≥ θkv(Tk−1)− qk−1. (35)
With the reduced constraints, we can reformulate the BS’s
optimization problem as
max
(T,q)
K∑
k=1
βk (qk − cTk) , (36)
s.t.
(a) θ1v(T1)− q1 ≥ 0,
(b) θkv(Tk)− qk ≥ θkv(Tk−1)− qk−1,
k, l ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, k 6= l.
We can solve this optimization problem by using La-
grangian multiplier method which is explained in the fol-
lowing steps. First, based on the optimization problem, we
have the Largrangian as
L =
K∑
i=1
{βi (qk − cTk) + µi[θkv(Tk)− θkv(Tk−1)
+ qk−1 − qk]}+ νθ1v(T1)− q1. (37)
To find the optimal contract (Tk, qk), take the partial deriva-
tives regarding qk and Tk, then set the value equal to zero.
For k = K we have
∂L
∂Tk
= µkθkv
′(Tk) = βk, (38)
∂L
∂qk
= 0 ⇔ βk = µk. (39)
For k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}, we have
∂L
∂Tk
= µkθkv
′(Tk)− µk+1θk+1v
′(Tk) = βk, (40)
∂L
∂qk
= βk − µk + µk+1 = 0. (41)
With the 2K equations, we can solve µk and Tk, k ∈
{1, . . . ,K}, by backward induction. As βk, θk, and valuation
function v are known, we can first get TK from (38) and (39).
Tk for k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1} are then obtainable by (40) and
(41) by solving
v′(Tk) =
θk
µkθk − µk+1θk+1
. (42)
By now, we have the payment Tk available for the optimal
contract. The required traffic can be found by using the IC
and IR constraints. First, with constraint (a), we have
q1 = θ1v
′(T1). (43)
Then, by using constraint (b), we have
qk = θiv
′(Tk)− θkv
′(Tk−1) + qk−1, (44)
where k ∈ {2, . . . ,K}.
The optimal contract solved by this optimization problem
gives all APs from type 2 to K positive payoffs, and only
the lowest type of AP will have a zero payoff. The social
welfare achieved by the highest type of payoff is the same
as as that from the ideal case when the type is known by
the BS, which is an efficient transaction. However, the social
welfare from the other types is lower than that from the ideal
case, and thus yielding an inefficient transaction.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we will first show the feasibility of the
contracts solved from the three mechanisms. Then, we will
compare the payoffs of the BS and APs, together with the
social welfare of the three contracts. Referring to previous
works in contract theory such as [21] and [23], we assume
K = 20 and give the simulation with 20 types of APs. For
simplicity, we consider a uniform distribution of AP types,
i.e., βk = 1/K . We set the unit payment cost of the BS
c = 0.01.
A. Contract Feasibility
1) Monotonicity: In Fig.2, we show the payment and
required traffic in the contracts given by the three proposed
mechanisms are incentive compatible, which ensures that the
payment and offloading traffic are proportional with the APs’
types.
In Fig. 2a, we plot the payment required from the APs
to the BS of the three contracts. We see that in all three
contracts, the APs of high type always require more payment
than that of the low type APs, i.e., the payment required by
the AP is a strictly increasing function of the AP’s type. The
highest payment shown in Fig. 2a also proves our conclusion
that the highest type AP in anti adverse selection achieves the
optimal efficiency as in the perfect discrimination contract.
Fig. 2b gives the amount of offloaded traffic required from
the BS to different type APs. It is clear that the amount of
offloaded traffic is also a strictly increasing function of the
AP type, i.e., a higher type AP (with large idle capacity)
is required to offload more cellular than that of a low type
AP (with small idle capacity) such that the workload is in
accordance with the payment they received. Furthermore, we
see that the required amount of traffic in perfect discrimina-
tion and linear pricing are linear functions of type, and it is
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Fig. 2: Incentive compatibility of the three contracts.
a concave function of type in anti adverse selection which
is consistent with our conclusion in Section IV.C that the
offloading traffic q is a nonlinear curve. Among the three
contracts, the perfect discrimination contract requires the
largest amount of offloaded traffic from the AP, followed by
the anti adverse selection under information asymmetry. The
smallest amount of traffic is required under linear pricing.
We have seen similar results from [15] that the price in a
perfect competition market and the monopoly price serves as
the upper and lower bounds of market price, respectively. The
reason is that the price competition in a competitive market
drives the market price up and the monopoly market drives
the market price down as the monopolist is selfish and only
tries to maximize its own payoff.
2) Self Revealability: In Fig. 3, we show that the contract
solved by anti adverse selection is self revealing. We plot the
payoffs of type-5, type-10, and type-15 APs when selecting
all the traffic-payment bundles offered by the BS. In Fig. 3
we see that the payoffs of each AP are concave functions.
The maximum points of the three curves are at the point
when APs selecting the type of traffic-payment bundle that
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Fig. 3: AP’s payoff with different type traffic-payment bun-
dles.
is the same as its own type. This proves that the contract
solved by anti adverse selection can automatically reveal the
real type of the APs. Thus, by designing a contract in this
form, the type of an AP will be automatically revealed to the
BS after its selection. In other words, the optimal contract
under information asymmetry enables the BS to solve the
information asymmetry and retrieve the information related
to AP type.
Moreover, Fig. 3 shows that the payoffs of the three types
of APs follows the inequality u5 < u10 < u15 when they
select the same traffic-payment bundle. This corroborates the
result shown in the monotonicity condition that the higher
the type of the AP, the larger the payoff it can receive when
selecting the same contract.
B. System Performance
First, in Fig. 4 we show the payoff of the BS under
the three contracts. The BS receives the maximum payoff
when there is no information asymmetry in the perfect
discrimination, since the BS has full knowledge of AP types.
Nonetheless, we can see that the proposed solution with
information asymmetry by the anti adverse selection yields
a payoff for the BS that outperforms the linear pricing
which receives the lowest payoff. Furthermore, the BS always
receive higher payoff when trading with high type APs than
that with low type APs. This result also in accordance with
our conclusion that the BS prefers to trade with high type
APs than with low type APs.
Here, we note that, even though the anti adverse selection
contract under information asymmetry can force the APs to
reveal their types, the exact value of the AP type is still
unavailable to the BS. Thus, the BS can only achieve a
near optimal payoff under information asymmetry, which is
always upper bounded by the perfect discrimination. The
linear pricing contract does not impose any restriction on
the APs’ choice of contract and less information is retrieved,
which impedes the BS from obtaining more payoff.
In Fig. 5, we plot the payoff of different type APs. In
the linear contract and anti adverse selection, the payoff of
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Fig. 4: BS’s payoff when contracting with different type APs.
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Fig. 5: Different type APs’ payoff.
APs is increasing with the type. By contrast, the payoff of
APs remains zero in the perfect discrimination. This result
proves our conclusion in Section IV.A that when the BS is
available of the AP’s type, it will not leave any information
rent for the AP. The anti adverse selection contract proves
the monotonicity of the contract that the higher the type of
AP, the larger the payoff it can receive under information
asymmetry. Furthermore, we see that all type APs in anti
adverse selection enjoys a positive payoff which is the
representation of information rent except for the lowest type
θ1 AP.
Overall, we see that linear pricing gives the APs the
highest payoff, followed by the anti adverse selection under
information asymmetry, then the ideal perfect discrimination
with no information asymmetry. However, for some of the
high type APs can obtain higher payoff from the optimal
contract under information asymmetry than the linear pric-
ing.
In Fig. 6, we show the social welfare of the three contracts
when the BS trading with different type APs. The social
welfare is also an increasing function of the AP’s type. The
linear pricing loses more social welfare than the anti adverse
selection contract when comparing with the perfect discrim-
ination. The anti adverse selection brings a low utilization
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Fig. 6: Social welfare when BS contracting with different
type APs.
of APs’ idle capacity compare to the perfect discrimination,
except for the highest type θK AP. The efficiency of idle
capacity utilization is only kept for the top type APs. We can
name this situation as the idle capacity utilization is distorted.
The linear pricing contract gives the lowest social welfare
(i.e., trading efficiency) since no in formation retrieving
strategy has been apply.
The distortion of lower type APs’ offloading traffic in the
anti adverse selection is the result of the BS’s attempt to
reduce the information rent of the high type APs. As we
have mentioned at the beginning of of Section IV.C, when
there is an information asymmetry, the high type APs have
the incentive to mimic low type APs to receive more payoff.
In order to reduce high type APs’ incentives in doing this,
the BS lowers the required amount of traffic of low type APs.
Since high type APs prefer to offload traffic for the BS, this
action stops the high type APs from pretending to be a low
type AP, meanwhile, leading to an underuntilization of low
type AP’s idle capacity.
In Fig. 7, we study the system performance when the
number of AP types increases, while the other parameters are
fixed. An increase in the number of types will inherently yield
an increase in the total number of APs pairs. Fig. 7a shows
similar properties as Fig. 4, since the BS can extract all payoff
from the APs due to the symmetric information in perfect
discrimination, while no information rent is retried by linear
pricing. Fig. 7b also proves the conclusions that we have
made in Fig. 5 that, when the BS cannot retrieve information
rent from the APs in linear pricing, the APs receive the
highest payoff, and the APs cannot gain any payoff when
the BS has full information in perfect discrimination.
In Fig. 7c, we show the social welfare of the three con-
tracts. We see that the social welfare is an increasing function
with the number of AP types. From Fig. 7c we also see that
without information asymmetry, the perfect discrimination
achieves the first best social welfare as we have stated
that it brings the Perato optimal for the system. Followed
by the anti adverse selection and linear pricing under the
information asymmetry. The larger the number of APs, the
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Fig. 7: The system performance when the number of AP types varies.
closer the anti adverse selection contract approximates the
perfect discrimination.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented a contract-theoretic model
for addressing the problem of incentivizing APs to offload
traffic for the BSs in an SDN-at-edge. We have proposed
a self-revealing contract: anti adverse selection to over-
come the information asymmetry that the BS is unaware
of the AP’s idle capacity. To evaluate the efficiency of our
proposed contract, we have introduced and analysed the
perfect discrimination and linear pricing as comparisons.
Simulation results have shown that our proposed approaches
can effectively incentivize APs to participate in the traffic
offloading process. In addition, the anti adverse selection
can achieve the second best outcome compare to the ideal
case perfect discrimination, while gives an optimal social
welfare compare with the linear pricing under information
asymmetry.
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